Flouting 150 years of reports on their political impotence, millions of informal workers have recently begun mobilizing for labor rights. What provoked this unexpected development?
mayor, Gustavo Petro, responded to court rulings in the recyclers' favor by bringing the majority of waste collection-previously run by an oligopoly of private waste corporations-under direct city control. Petro implemented a "zero waste" plan that aimed to contract recycler organizations to provide city-wide recycling services, which would eventually wholly supersede the "waste collection and burial" model (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá 2012). On December 9, 2013, however, Colombia's inspector-general removed Petro from office and banned him from political activity for 15 years on the grounds that Petro had violated the free market rights of private waste contractors and triggered a sanitary crisis during the transition to the public system (New York Times 2013). Four months later, following mass protests spearheaded by recyclers and an injunction by the Inter-American Human Rights Court, the Superior Tribunal of Bogotá reinstated Petro, who continued to implement his Zero Waste Plan.
By the end of his term in December 2015, Petro's administration had identified 14,000 recyclers through a multi-year census process, provided 18,000 city uniforms to registered recyclers, delivered pickup trucks to nearly 3,000 recyclers who previously worked by horseand-buggy, established monthly participatory forums on recycler policy in each of the city's 19 boroughs, campaigned for residents and businesses to hand over materials directly to recyclers, and-most groundbreakingly-made bi-monthly payments to 13,000 recyclers in recognition of their public service (UAESP 2015) . The city paid recyclers via text messages with codes that were redeemable for cash at ATMs based on the quantity of goods that they had sold to registered scrap dealers. To be sure, these policies were neither flawless nor comprehensive, and at times proved controversial even among recyclers (Parra 2015) . Nonetheless, they represented a paradigm shift for a city that historically treated recyclers as criminals, and an astonishing victory for a group of workers recently dismissed as powerless to contest policies that impact their lives.
What political and economic opportunities emerged since the time of Birkbeck's writing to enable this unlikely development? And what strategies did recyclers and their allies build to exploit these opportunities? In the first section of this paper, I review historical arguments about informal workers' lack of power and unity. In the next, I provide background on the Colombian recycler movement. I then argue that two broad economic and political shifts-the ascendance of neoliberalism iii and consolidation of democratic rights-created threats and opportunities that galvanized the emergence of the Colombian recycler movement. I conclude by reflecting on how this case challenges conventional assumptions about neoliberalism and sheds light on the causes and potentials of the recent global upsurge of informal worker organizing. Importantly, I do not seek to negate the crippling impacts that neoliberalism has had on global labor movements, but rather to highlight how, as Evans (2008) argues, "Every system of domination generates its own distinctive set of opportunities for challenge and transformation, and neo-liberal globalization is no exception" (p. 298).
<A> "Unorganizable" workers
Writing at the dawn of industrial capitalism, Marx and Engels first popularized the idea that workers who would come to be known as "informal" were too weak, fragmented, and capricious to organize as a class. They categorized "rag pickers" (recyclers), "organ grinders"
(street musicians), "knife grinders" (knife sharpeners), "tinkers" (iterant tin smiths), and "porters" (carriers) as "lumpenproletariat," an underclass of outcasts and criminals who lacked the solidarity and structural power to collectively challenge capital (Marx and Engels [1852] 1978). Ironically, some of Marx's fiercest rightwing critics, the modernization theorists of the 1950s and '60s, helped entrench pessimism about informal worker mobilization. Rostow's (1960) "The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto," proposed a linear theory of development, in which capitalism gradually led to widespread prosperity and security.
By this logic, there was no need to contemplate the revolutionary potential of informal workers, as they were merely precapitalist relics, soon to be absorbed into the modern economy.
Both the Marxist and Modernist traditions share what Agarwala (2013) calls the "problematic assumption" that informal workers are "temporarily operating on the margins of the central labor-capital relationship." (p. 8) This assumption lives on in some labor and policy circles, but has largely been debunked in scholarship over the past 35 years by a formidable and rapidly expanding body of literature on formal-informal sector linkages. iv Nonetheless, scholars continue to point to structural barriers that appear to hamstring informal workers' capacity for collective action, which Collier and Palmer-Rubin (2011) summarize as "an unclear target of grievance (e.g., common employer), small networks for collective action, and minimal or uncertain flows of time and money available to devote to problem solving" (p. 28). Such pessimism is in part an artifact of the "industrial unionism" model that has dominated the past 75 years of labor organizing. This model assumes that workers are joined together by a common formal employment relation that allows them to bargain with employers, whose profits depend on production in fixed locales. This premise is no longer a good starting point even for many manufacturing workers with formal jobs, but makes no sense at all for most of the world's workers.
<B> Organizing the "unorganizable"
Flouting 150 years of reports on their political impotence, millions of informal workers have recently begun mobilizing to make their voices heard by governments, employers, and transnational organizations. v To be sure, organizing informal workers is not a wholly novel phenomenon-at the beginning of the 19 th century all workers were informal, and examples abound throughout the twentieth century of worker groups defying assumptions about their lack of strength and unity. vi What appears to distinguish the past twenty-five years, however, is the scale, pace, and sophistication of organizing among workers previously excluded from the labor movement. There have been major breakthroughs in organizing among domestic workers, street vendors, home-based workers, and recyclers-all of whom have built robust transnational networks to exchange strategies and advocate to transnational bodies (Bonner and Spooner 2012) . In response, the International Labor Organization has adopted resolutions on the rights of home-based workers (1996), informal workers (2002) , and domestic workers (2011).
This unexpected development is forcing scholars to pay heed. New works shed light on how informal workers address the three problems highlighted by Collier and Palmer-Rubin (2011:28) . First, many organized informal workers overcome "the unclear target of grievance"
problem by making rights-based demands to the state for legal protections (Bhowmik 2007 , Cross 1998 , welfare benefits (Agarwala 2013), and official remuneration (Jacobi and Besen 2011) . In this way, ironically, informal workers often push the state to play a more direct role in ensuring their livelihoods than it does for formal private sector workers (Agarwala 2013:199) .
Second, many organized informal workers approach the "small networks for collective action"
problem by organizing in neighborhoods rather than at worksites (Andrae and Beckman 2013);
bringing together scattered workers into cooperatives and worker centers (Rodríguez-Garavito 2006 , Fine 2009 , and Chen et al. 2006 ; and using identity cards and self-esteem workshops to construct collective identities as workers and citizens (Wittman, Desmarais, and Wiebe 2010) .
The latter strategy helps many informal workers forge solidarity across divisions of gender, race, and class (Quiroz-Becerra 2013). Finally, many informal workers overcome the "uncertain flows of time and money" problem by mobilizing resources from the state, NGOs, development funds, corporations, and universities (Kabeer, Milward, and Sudarshan 2013) .
Though recent works shine light on the innovative strategies of informal worker campaigns, less attention has been paid to the underlying political and economic structures that facilitate such innovations. Such information is key to addressing the puzzle of why so many informal worker organizations have emerged globally over the past thirty years, a period when neoliberalism is said to have eroded workers' basis of power. Resolving this puzzle is far beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on a single case study. Nonetheless, recycler movements are a reasonable entry point for this line of inquiry because, as Medina (2007) notes, recycling "epitomizes the informal sector: it constitutes a labor-intensive, low-technology, low-paid, unrecorded, and unregulated activity" (p. 64). Recyclers' extreme marginality and the Colombian state's violent repression of labor movements make this a "least likely" case (Flyvbjerg 2006) , in which circumstances appear highly favorable to the "unorganizable informal worker" hypothesis.
The aim of this paper is not merely to falsify such conventional wisdom, however, but to identify structural factors that facilitated the emergence of the Colombian recycler movement, and to challenge conventional assumptions about the impacts of neoliberalism and democratization on labor movements.
Throughout this paper, I draw on three concepts from social movement theory that shed light on the dynamic relation between movement contexts, strategies, and outcomes. First, resource mobilization theory posits that social movements emerge when aggrieved groups access resources such as "legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor" that are typically controlled by elites (McCarthy and Zald 1977 :1220 , see also Jenkins and Perrow 1977 . Though scholars have criticized this theory for exaggerating movements' dependence on elites (e.g., McAdam 1999, Piven and Cloward 1979) , research suggests that elite support plays a central role for informal workers. For example, based on analysis of nine informal worker movements in four countries, Kabeer, Milward, and Sudarshan (2013) find that "spontaneous self-organization among these workers is extremely-low… organizational impetus has largely come from the efforts of middleclass actors belonging to NGOs" (p. 14). Second, political opportunity theory highlights the role of perceived vulnerabilities within political systems (e.g., opening of political institutions, elite disputes, shifts in levels of state repression) in catalyzing popular mobilizations (Eisinger 1973 , McAdam 1999 , Tilly 1978 . Such apertures are key for movements of informal workers, which typically make demands directly to the state rather than to capital (Agarwala 2013). Finally, frame theory calls attention to the ways in which movement actors "assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists" (Snow and Benford 1988:198; also Snow et al. 1986, Johnston and Noakes 2005) . Such struggles over meaning loom large in informal worker movements, which contest and redefine norms about what it means to be a worker and who has the responsibilities of employer (Chun 2009 Recyclers should not be seen, but rather thrown away in black bags like garbage. They are a lower caste". Stigma against recyclers is prevalent around the world (e.g., Gidwani and Reddy 2011), but has manifested in an exceptionally sadistic form in Colombia. Since the late 1980s, fascist-inspired "social cleansing" groups have killed at least 2,000 recyclers, beggars, and prostitutes-to whom they refer as "desechables" (disposable people) (Medina 2007) .
Seeking to increase their voice and power, thousands of recyclers in small and large cities across Colombia collectively organized into cooperatives, many of which united into regional networks. The most politically influential network and the object of analysis of this study, is the Though its outsized public profile could give the impression that the ARB represents the vast majority of Bogotá's recyclers, it in fact counts only 1,800 recyclers among its ranks (Acosta and Ortiz 2013: 9), about 10% of the city's estimated 1,800 full-time recyclers (Schamber et al. 2007 ). viii The rest of the city's recyclers can be loosely categorized into three groups. First, several thousand recyclers are members of non-ARB cooperatives, some of which are engaged in intense conflicts with the ARB. Such rivalries stem from competition for resources such as membership, political influence, state and NGO-support, and service provision contracts, and are at times exacerbated by ideological differences and accusations of corruption.
Second are "independent" recyclers who work outside the cooperatives, but like most cooperative members, are not homeless. Independents earn slightly lower average wages than do cooperative members, but many of them believe that they can work more efficiently and harmoniously outside of institutional settings (Aluna 2011). Though independents constitute the majority of Bogotá's recyclers, their atomization largely thwarts their ability to exercise political power. Finally, the most voiceless and denigrated recyclers are the homeless, who are commonly looked down upon as drug addicts and criminals even by their housed counterparts. Notably, ARB cofounder Silvio Ruiz-Grisales (Interview 2011) claims that "the role of our organization is to defend the rights of all recyclers-those who wear our shirts, those who wear the shirts of other organizations, and, to an even greater extent, those who do not even know that recycler organizations exist." To be sure, the ARB's political and cultural struggles have yielded benefits for recyclers far beyond the bounds of its own membership, or even its own city and country. Yet as Betancourt (2010) argues, "Bogotá's waste pickers do not necessarily share similar needs, objectives or struggles, and they largely differ in the way they work, organize themselves and relate to waste picking activities" (p. 19).
<B> The ARB organizing model
The ARB's organizing model centers on the pursuit of three mutually reinforcing, overlapping objectives. First, ARB members seek to increase their social standing by reframing their work from parasitic survival activity into a productive profession. ix One member explains:
"What we have done basically is to take the lowest profession there is and to raise it to a
professional level, to demonstrate that recyclers actually help construct our society" (Interview José Manuel Nieto 2012). To this end, the ARB uses performative strategies including professional conduct courses for members, the provision of uniforms and credentials, media outreach, and presentations at public forums, schools, and fairs. Second, ARB members pursue political empowerment by contesting norms not only about what it means to be a worker, but about who has the responsibilities of employer. This is a daunting challenge due to the recyclers' befogged structural relations with the many beneficiaries of their labor. As Ruiz-Grisales 
<A> What Changed?
Though the earliest known recycler cooperative in Colombia-and indeed the worldwas established in Medellin in 1962, attempts at collective organizing over the next 25 years were scarce and largely abortive (Medina 2007) . Based on his analysis of two such fruitless efforts at the Cali dump, Birkbeck (1978) concluded that, "it is... doubtful that such organizations can ever achieve any radical changes for the garbage picker" (p. 1184). What has changed in the "political opportunity structure" (Tarrow 1998) of Colombian recyclers since the time of Birkbeck's research?
In the following sections, I highlight three mechanisms through which the rise of neoliberalism and consolidation of democratic rights enabled recyclers to build organizations, forge collective agendas, and challenge state policy. First, human rights and development organizations grew exponentially in Latin America beginning in the 1980s due to the neoliberal rollback of state services, the expansion of democratic freedoms, and advances in communications and transportation technology. Though, the merits of the "NGOzation" of social movements are widely debated, the rapid rise of recycler movements in Colombia would not have been possible without support from domestic and transnational civil society organizations.
Second, the privatization of waste management raised the incentive for collective organizing both by threatening to usurp much of the role of recycling from recyclers and hand it to corporations, and by creating a narrow window by which they could protect and improve their livelihoods through formalization. Third, democratic reform, particularly human rights protections of the Constitution of 1991, served as a key avenue through which the recyclers gained leverage over state and private interests.
<TABLE 1, about here> <A> Shift 1-the expansion of civil society support
Many scholars have lamented the so-called "NGOzation" of political struggle in the Global South (e.g., Alvarez 1999 , Biekart 1999 , Jenkins 2008 Munck 2006; Pisano 1996; Silliman 1999 (Fundación Social 1996) . By its apex in 1996, FS's annual budget for recycler programs had grown to US $700,000, and FS helped recyclers access an additional US $300,000
in state funding (Aluna 2011:106) . That year, however, FS announced a plan to phase out recycler programming over the next two years due to internal financial problems.
<B> Withdrawal of FS and the ARB's political turn
Though FS created organizations and networks that would engage in large scale political struggle, such struggle did not take shape until after FS's withdrawal in 1996. During the early 1990s, ARB leaders focused their energies on cooperative development and social service provision. The downtown headquarters was used as a food kitchen and attention center, where members could receive free food, education, health, recreation, and childcare services. After Third, ARB leaders have forged alliances with a host of national and transnational environmental justice NGOs (e.g., ENDA, GAIA, CEMPRE, The Zero Waste Alliance) to demand policies that protect both recycler livelihoods and the environment. Together, they have lobbied municipal officials for zero waste policies and sent recycler delegations to five global climate summits to advocate for resource recovery programs as an alternative to waste disposal technologies. Ciplet (2014) finds that the transnational delegations have had limited policy success, but have generated "unprecedented" media attention for recyclers, increasing their legitimacy in the eyes of domestic and transnational funders (pp. 88). The ARB's embrace of the increasingly resonant environmental frame is a classic example of "frame extension," that is, the extension of a social movement's "primary framework so as to encompass interests… of considerable salience to potential adherents" (Snow et al. 1986:472) While recycler movements in many parts of the globe have portrayed recyclers as environmental champions, this framing may be especially important in the Colombian context as an alternative to the more perilous "labor rights" frame.
<A> Shift 2 -the privatization of waste management
A second major shift in the recyclers' position since the time of Birkbeck's writing occurred due to the privatization of waste management, part of Colombia's aggressive agenda of neoliberal reform during the 1980s and 1990s. Typically, privatization refers to the outsourcing of government functions to the private sector. The privatization of waste collection services in the developing world, however, is often accompanied by a second form of privatization: a transfer in the legal status of waste from a common property resource to private property of waste management companies, which attempt to usurp the role previously played by informal recyclers (Samson 2009a:84) . Since the 1980s, privatization has successively threatened recyclers' very existence by cutting them off from their three access points to waste-dumps, streets, and buildings. As ARB-President Nohra Padilla explained in an address to the 2013
International Labor Conference, "Recyclers who are denied access to garbage are like fishers without fish, or farmers without land. We cannot survive..." (Bonner and Spooner 2012 ). Yet while privatization is typically presumed to have uniformly erosive effects on labor's power, for the recyclers, it has also created a narrow aperture to protect and vastly improve their livelihoods by winning inclusion in formal waste management.
For most of the 20 th century, Bogotá had a two-track waste management system in which the city provided official door-to-door solid waste pickup and final disposal services, while recyclers salvaged materials from many points along the waste stream (Aluna 2011). The history of official waste management dates back to 1875 when the town council supervised a band of 100 prisoners who cleaned the streets daily (Ruiz-Restrepo and Barnes 2010). This soon proved insufficient, so a business tax was levied to raise funds for a small fleet of drivers, coaches, animals, and-eventually-trucks to collect waste. In 1954, Bogotá established EDIS, a stateowned enterprise that ran the city's waste pickup and disposal operations. Meanwhile, thousands of farmers migrated to Bogotá's urban slums fleeing the violence that killed three hundred thousand peasants in the 1950s (Palacios 2003) . Many of them began to search through waste to find food for consumption, scraps to feed animals, materials for shanties, and fuel for heat in the winter. Soon, they discovered their ability to earn a living from waste (Medina 2007:55) . Most recyclers during this period collected from dumps and riverbeds, but some, known as botelleros bought newspapers, bottles, and jars from residents, while others known as chatarreros collected scrap metal on the streets. Such activity mushroomed over the second half of the twentieth century, as the city's population swelled from 1 to 7 million (Medina 2007:154-6 ).
Over the past thirty years, Bogotá and other Colombian municipalities have attempted to dissolve the two track public-informal waste system and replace it with one that is run exclusively by private corporations (Ruiz-Restrepo and Barnes 2010). Such privatization is driven not only by classic neoliberal logics of cutting public expenditures and increasing efficiency, but a related set of material and symbolic concerns. Developers and city officials see recyclers as impediments to the production of modern, "green and clean" urban landscapes, blemishes to be removed from view like the trash that they handle. Also, as waste streams expand due to increased consumption, and the demand for recyclables escalates due to environmental consciousness and industrial growth, waste management has become increasingly lucrative (Medina 2007) . Municipal governments raise revenue by granting waste corporations monopolies on all aspects of waste management including recycling.
<B> Eviction from the waste dump
The first major step in this development occurred in the mid-1980s, when cities began to Recyclers have worked in Colombia for more or less, poorly counted, 100 years. We developed our trade for the first 60 or 70 years without any apparent problems. Why?
Because we were in the dump where nobody entered. The politicians didn't go there, the government didn't go there, neither did the media. Nobody went there because it simply didn't exist. Society turned a blind eye to us. There were a few things moving around in the garbage, but they weren't human beings. They were garbage.
The sudden appearance of thousands of people digging through trash on the streets of middle and upper class neighborhoods amidst the tumult and violence that consumed Colombia in the late 1980s provoked a spectrum of reactions. At one pole, a coalition of foundations, NGOs, universities, and government agencies helped recyclers build organizations in order to improve their conditions and incomes. At another, the recyclers faced scorn from many citizens, some of whom formed vigilante "social cleansing" squads to assassinate them and other street dwellers.
In 1992, around the peak of this activity, eleven corpses of murdered recyclers were discovered at a medical school in Barranquilla. Their organs had been sold for transplants and their bodies used for dissection (Medina 2007 ).
The attacks created new external sympathy and internal urgency for the recyclers' cause. The strike failed and the municipality disbanded EDIS gradually from 1994-1996, during which time the ARB and FS jointly took a contract to provide 10% of the city's pickup and disposal services (Samson 2009a:66) . After EDIS was fully dissolved, however, the municipality terminated its contract with the ARB and began exclusively commissioning to private corporations. The recyclers were once again relegated to the informal economy, but the experience of working for the city left them determined to push their way back into formal service provision. Padilla (interview 2012) says, "That experience was the basis for our struggle today. We learned that we could be, that we knew how to be, and that we must be included in formal waste management." By this point, recyclers in small municipalities such as La Plata and Chiquinquirá had already won official roles as service providers (Ruiz-Restrepo and Barnes 2010:101).
The privatization of waste management created a prospective avenue through which Colombian cooperatives could not only compete to win formal service provision contracts, but also expand their range of operations. Yet winning entry would pit them against well-healed and well-connected rivals, private waste and recycling firms. Moreover, just as some recycler cooperatives strived to penetrate the realm of formal door-to-door waste pickup, the private firms began taking steps towards usurping control of all aspects of the increasingly profitable field of recycling. Such efforts were abetted by policies that threatened to shut recyclers out of their two remaining access points to waste, the streets and buildings. In 2002, Colombia's president attempted to transform waste's legal status into the private property of waste management firms.
Meanwhile, beginning in the mid-1990s, the municipal governments of Bogotá and several other cities discussed plans to obligate citizens to separate recyclable from non-recyclable waste, both of which would be picked up by official service providers. Though such programs have yet to be widely implemented, municipalities began to sell off exclusive collection rights to private firms, potentially displacing recyclers who currently collect recyclables from buildings (Sampson 2009:70) . Notably, the ARB and other recycler organizations strongly support the creation of official recycling routes, but argue that they should be run and staffed by recyclers.
<A> Shift 3-juridical empowerment
Social movement activists in the global south are increasingly using the language of human rights to frame their political objectives, and turning to courts to advance them (Couso, Hunees and Sieder 2010). Many scholars have criticized this trend as undermining insurgent political projects and paving the way for imperialism (Douzinas, 2007; Feldman 2009; Spivak 2004; Yiftachel 2009 ). For example, Brown (2004) argues that by focusing on negative liberal liberties (freedom from state oppression) rather than positive ones (access to food, shelter and healthcare), the dominant human rights paradigm fatalistically concedes possibilities for "a more substantive democratization of power" (p. 462). Moreover, human rights discourse is said to justify imperialist interventions by producing individualized, decontextualized, and depoliticized subjects who appear to need external assistance (Brown 2004 , Rancière, 2004 Zizek, 2005) .
Meanwhile, juridical strategies for advancing rights are seen as legitimizing the status quo by circumscribing the role of mass-based movements and shifting contestation to sanctioned institutional channels (Munger 2012) .
Given these condemnations, why are social movement activists flocking to frame social justice demands in the language of human rights? One response is that reductive critiques of human rights overlook the diversity of forms in which human rights are created and recreated through local movement struggles (Stammers 2009 ). As Fadaee (2014) argues, the very concept of "human rights" may be understood as an empty signifier, "which can only gain meaning if attached to specific contexts and practices" (p. 568). In what follows, I argue that while the aforementioned criticisms of human rights are not unfounded, they do not align with the experiences of Colombian recyclers. The ARB used human rights strategies to pursue both negative rights (countering laws that would cut off their access to waste) and positive ones (winning inclusion in the formal waste management system). Rather than rejecting politics, recyclers pushed the state to expand its role in guaranteeing their livelihoods. And rather than abandoning popular protest in favor of legal advocacy, recyclers used both strategies in concert.
They organized protests first to signify the subjects and directives of rights, and then to hold policy makers accountable for their implementation. Importantly, legal understandings were not only generated within the courtroom, but through a gamut of informal subnational and transnational spaces.
<B> The 2003 Cases: The right of Cooperatives to Compete in Bogotá
In late 20 th century Latin America, democratic consolidation led to a crop of new constitutions that expanded social, economic, and cultural rights, and created higher courts with stronger powers of enforcement. Colombia was a trailblazer in this regard, as significant The first recyclers' rights case was brought to the Constitutional Court by the ARB and its pro bono legal aid in 2003. As discussed in the previous section, from [1994] [1995] [1996] , the ARB helped the city to collect waste during the municipal workers' unsuccessful strike and the subsequent period in which the state-owned recycling enterprise was phased out. Once this process was completed, however, the city terminated its contract with the ARB and handed over rights to all recycling services to private corporations. Undeterred, ARB leaders prepared to compete for a contract in the subsequent tendering process in 2003. They procured international partners to provide financial backing, conducted studies of Bogotá and Buenos Aires's waste management systems, and improved their own operational capacity (interview ARB leader, Olivia Maza 2011).
When the ARB and its legal team began to prepare a bid in 2002, however, they ran up against two barriers to their entry into the competition. First, according to Law 142, only stock owned companies-not associations of cooperatives such as the ARB-could compete for contracts in large cities. Second, the city's narrow terms for the tendering process restricted bidding to companies that had provided services in cities with at least a half million people for the preceding five years. This excluded the ARB from competition de facto, without affecting the corporations that had won contracts in the previous tendering process. It also presented a daunting challenge to the ARB's pro bono legal team, as human rights law is difficult to apply to highly technical administrative matters such as a tendering process (interview ARB lawyer, Adriana Ruiz-Restrepo 2012). Nonetheless, the ARB legal team argued that policy that was "technically and formally legal" could still undermine human rights principles by threatening recyclers' sole survival niche (Samson 2009a:68) . The Constitutional Court accepted the case, and ruled in the recyclers' favor, stipulating not only that the recyclers must be allowed to compete in tendering processes, but that affirmative action clauses should be implemented on their behalf. However, the municipality expedited the closure of the tendering process and awarded contracts before the ruling was made. The ruling could not be applied retroactively, thus the recyclers would have to wait another eight years for the next tendering process for a chance to compete (interview Constitutional Court clerk, Javier Francisco Arenas 2011).
In the midst of the Bogotá recyclers' (temporarily) unsuccessful bid for inclusion in the formal waste management system, President Andrés Pastrana, on his last day in office, issued a national decree that endangered recyclers' right to pursue their trade informally as well. Decree CIVISOL soon learned that recyclers in Cali had already filed tutelas to protest their eviction from the Navarro Dump-ironically, the very site where Birbeck wrote of the recyclers' political impotence 30 years before. In 2008, the city had replaced the publically owned Navarro
Dump with a private landfill, the last step in a comprehensive privatization plan for Cali's waste management system. The city had promised 600 displaced recycler families compensation for their loss of livelihood, but the assistance never materialized, provoking the recyclers to occupy a historic church in protest (Samson 2009a) . Additionally, twenty-four recyclers filed tutelas, which were rejected on the grounds that the city had "no type of responsibility" to the recyclers because "no contractual or legal relation" linked the two parties. It must not be forgotten the fact that the recyclers, although informally, acted as entrepreneurs. Therefore, an appropriate alternative, rather than converting them into employees of the big recycling companies, is providing them some space to keep acting as entrepreneurs, promoting their organizational capacity and strengthening their capacities and opportunities to appropriately carry out the activity that they had developed throughout time. That's the social movement. They had to detect and spot change, they had to understand their environment, that their environment changed, that the opportunities narrowed, and that in that little tiny hole-they had to get in. And they had to look for lawyers. 
<A> Conclusion
Labor scholars and organizers have long dismissed informal workers as "unorganizable,"
presuming them to be too weak and fragmented to collectively challenge capital and the state.
Undeterred, millions of "the world's most vulnerable workers" have begun mobilizing for labor and human rights over the past quarter-century, a period when neoliberalism is said to have Ruiz-Restrepo (interview 2012) likens formality to a house and informality to the area surrounding it, where "waste pickers were being socially cleansed and running around the pool."
This metaphor overstates the informal/formal dichotomy, xx but is useful in envisioning the power asymmetry between informal recyclers and waste corporations. Elaborating the metaphor, we might imagine that for nearly a century house outsiders eked out a living by sorting through a trashcan full of waste primarily produced within the house, and selling back valuable components. Over time, members of the house demanded more raw materials to fuel their consumption, which in turn produced more waste and provided employment for more members of the growing population of outsiders. The swelling hordes of recyclers repulsed and frightened house insiders, some of whom saw a business opportunity. These insiders privatized the increasingly valuable resource of waste, bringing the trashcan back into the house in order to sort through it with modern technology. Just as they were closing the door, however, a group of outsiders stuck a wedge in it, pried it open, and declared, 'If you take the can into the house,
we're coming with it.' If civil society support was the vehicle that recyclers used to arrive at the door of the house, then the Constitution of 1991 was the wedge. Notably, the employment of these tools required collaboration between outsiders and sympathetic insiders. The door is now open, but it remains to be seen how many recyclers will be welcomed into the house and whether they will be capable of building enterprises within it. 
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x Lavalle and Bueno (2011) and Guenther (2011) provide more comprehensive responses to the NGOzation thesis. xi Ruiz-Restrepo and Barnes (2010) , lawyers who work with the ARB, explain this dependency as follows: "Organization depends on three resources that are very scarce when living in poverty: time, space and money...
[there] is never enough to invest in creating and running a business establishment or a civic-solidary organization, whose utility is still an unproven risk." (p. 95). xii Key backers include transnational development banks (e.g., The Interamerican Development Bank, The World Bank), foundations (e.g., Ford and Gates), corporate sponsors (e.g., Natura Cosmetics and PepsiCo), and NGOs (e.g., WIEGO, ENDA, AVINA, GAIA). xiii Literally "strong handed"-used to describe leaders who are tough on crime, guerillas, and leftist movements. 
